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Abstract 
 We apply a game-theoretic model to the analysis of the recent spate of 
corporate scandals in which firms have cheated their investors, often with the aid 
of external auditors.  We characterize the different types of equilibria that obtain 
for different parameter ranges in an auditor’s absence (the parameters we consider 
being “early signal accuracy” – a measure of transparency – and “withdrawal 
costs” – a measure of the liquidity of investments).  We also analyze whether and 
under what conditions the presence of an informed auditor could lead to an 
improvement in the sense of honest behavior replacing cheating as the firms’ 
equilibrium strategy.  In doing so we take into account the auditor’s incentives to 
collude with his clients or extort from them.  We use our results to derive some 
policy predictions including those relating to the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms, and 
contrast the case of a firm-hired intermediary (like an auditor) with the situation 
in which an intermediary is hired by investor consortia.  Interestingly, we find that 
mandatory disclosure of audit fees could guarantee honest behavior, in 
equilibrium, for much of the parameter space in which cheating would have 
prevailed in an auditor’s absence – as investors are able to check that audit fees lie 
in a range which removes incentives to cheat for the auditor and his clients.  Such 
disclosure would need to be backed by heavy penalties for false disclosure.  We 
also find that while firm-hired intermediaries have a non-monotone reaction to 
improvements in public transparency, initially favoring and then opposing them, 
investor-hired intermediaries unambiguously dislike improvements in public 
                                                 
1 School of Economics and Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, 90 Stamford 
Road, Singapore 178903. E-mail : bguha@smu.edu.sg This work was largely done when I was a 
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transparency.  We argue that frequent rotation of an auditor’s clients may have 
costs, not just benefits. 
JEL Classification : C72, D82, L20. 
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1. Introduction 
  The recent spate of corporate scandals involving fraudulent accounting by 
firms, often abetted by their external auditors, throws into focus a host of 
interesting issues.   At the same time these factors and the general atmosphere of 
business pessimism have also resulted in some questioning of the reliability of 
agencies such as auditing companies or credit rating agencies which are supposed 
to intermediate between firms and investors.   The policy implications of various 
measures, for instance the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, meant to prevent more such 
occurrences, are also a subject of much debate. 
We analyze these issues by considering a framework where firms engage 
in long term relationships with a set of investors.  The firms may be (a) always  
honest or (b)opportunistic.  Firms of the first type are intrinsically honest:  they do 
not cheat investors.  They do however maximize profits subject to this constraint2.  
The second type of firms, opportunists, may either act honestly, or cheat, 
depending on what they view as more profitable.  Thus the two actions in the 
opportunist firms' strategy space are "act honestly, cheat" where cheating may be 
interpreted as distorting internal accounts to convey an exaggerated picture of the 
company's profits.   Standard examples of this include writing off huge amounts 
and using this to boost pro-forma profits,  that supposedly reflect normal business 
activities,  or not disclosing stock options as a cost (given that they are part of the 
managerial compensation package) in their profit statement.    
 
                                                 
2 Other studies have also assumed some degree of  “limited rationality” on the part of honest firms 
- see Dixit (2003). 
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There exist some publicly observable signals,  for instance stock prices,  or 
the profit statements published by firms, which though imperfect indicators of 
true value nevertheless imply a positive probability π  of investors finding out if a 
firm has acted dishonestly:  and then they may withdraw their funds from it.   
Investors optimize depending on relative payoffs and on whether they 
expect the firm to behave honestly or cheat.  Accordingly they decide whether to 
invest in the firm in the first place, and in each new period,  whether to reinvest or 
to withdraw their funds.  As the story accommodates multiple periods the 
opportunistic firms would also be representative of firms which have been 
established for some time, rather than only of fresh startups floating IPOs.   This 
seems warranted as most of the current corporate scandals involve firms with an 
established reputation and a large existing clientele of investors. 
Using a game theoretic setup, we then model the interactions between 
firms and investors, and determine the nature of the equilibrium.  As it turns out, 
equilibria can be of different types depending on parameter values.  Then we 
introduce intermediaries into the framework.   These intermediaries are one sided 
in the sense that they provide investors with information about the firms, but 
provide no information about the investors to the firms.  Examples include 
external auditing firms and credit rating agencies.   One feature which 
distinguishes such intermediation from many other cases of intermediation 
analyzed in the literature is that while these intermediaries are supposed to 
represent the investors' interests, they are paid by the firms, either directly in fees 
or through more elaborate interlocking effects if for instance their relationship 
with the firm extends beyond audit to the provision of other profitable services 
like consultancy, investment banking, etc.   Keeping this in mind we check 
whether it is possible to sustain an equilibrium achieved through intermediation 
when the intermediary acts honestly.   As a part of the verification of the 
equilibrium we examine the intermediary's incentives to collude with the firm 
(and the firm's to collude with the intermediary) and also the intermediary's 
incentive to extort exorbitant fees from the firm by threatening to falsely report 
that the firm has been dishonest.   Examining these seems particularly relevant in 
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view of recent instances where auditing companies have been accused of 
deliberately misrepresenting information to mislead investors, and given the 
growing skepticism among many of the accuracy of credit ratings, with some 
clients complaining that their claims are systematically downgraded.    
Later, we also consider how the analysis might be different if the 
intermediaries had been paid not by firms but by a consortium of investors who 
sought information about the firms. 
Then we interpret our findings in terms of their policy implications.  In 
particular, we consider the impact of (a) implications for mandatory disclosure of 
audit fees, (b) improvements in transparency or in the informativeness of the 
publicly observable signals,  on firms' behavior and on intermediaries' fees and 
incentives, (c) the implications of banning an auditing firm from the provision of 
non audit activities and (d) the consequences of a compulsory rotation of clients 
of auditing firms. 
We find that mandatory disclosure of audit fees could guarantee honest 
behavior, in equilibrium, for much of the parameter space in which cheating 
would have prevailed in an auditor’s absence – as investors are able to check that 
audit fees lie in a range which removes incentives to cheat for the auditor and his 
clients.  Mandatory audit fee disclosure, backed by heavy penalties for false 
disclosure, would thus constitute an effective policy measure to rule out corporate 
fraud for this range of parameters.  We also see that an improvement in 
transparency, such as requiring that the firm disclose stock options as a cost, is 
welcomed by firm-hired intermediaries to a certain extent,  as it increases their 
fees,  but not beyond a certain level : intuitively,  if transparency is too high,  
firms stay honest even without intermediation so there is insufficient demand for 
intermediaries' services.   Firms however dislike a rise in transparency as it 
worsens their bargaining position vis a vis intermediaries.  Intermediaries hired by 
investor consortia also unambiguously dislike a rise in transparency, as this 
reduces their fees – an aspect in which they differ from firm-hired intermediaries 
like auditors.   We also show that an intermediary's incentives to collude diminish 
if its expected lifespan is high.   Accordingly we show that measures such as the 
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compulsory rotation of an auditing firm's clients have costs as well as benefits.  
By shortening the length of its business relationship with each client it may 
increase its incentives to collude if information about collusive behavior does not 
spread quickly.   Using similar logic an indirect benefit of the low level of 
competition among intermediaries in today's markets is that it tends to lengthen an 
intermediary's lifespan decreasing incentives to collude.   
In a later section, we show how public observability of payoffs in our 
simple model would alter the picture, reducing the scope for cheating and making 
auditing superfluous.  However, this derives from the fact that in this model 
observability of payoffs is a sure guide to whether cheating has taken place. 
     
2. Related Themes in the Literature 
 
This paper is related to many strands of the theoretical and empirical 
literature.  Dixit (2003) has described a setup where both parties in an economic 
transaction face a moral hazard, and each represents a random draw from a large 
population.   Anonymity prevents a cheater from being recognized as such by the 
new parties with whom he transacts and in this context the paper analyzes how 
private intermediation could help.   In our model, only one party has an incentive  
to cheat - while Dixit considers an (asymmetric) prisoner's dilemma, the prisoner's 
dilemma that we consider is one-sided.   Also, unlike Dixit's paper which matches 
firms and investors in iid random pairings each period, we allow for more 
persistent relationships.   In our model the investor has the choice of reinvesting 
with the same firm next period.   Only if he decides not to do so will he be 
randomly matched with another firm.  Another difference is that in the Dixit paper 
intermediaries provide their clients with information about the other party, but  
the bulk of the focus in our paper is on the case where firms pay intermediaries,  
which are supposed to represent the investors' interests (so that the client is the 
party whose behavior is to be investigated).   This makes collusion between the 
intermediary and the client a more likely situation than the "double-crossing" 
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considered by Dixit (of an intermediary supplying its client with false 
information).    
Other papers relating to the cheating literature include Greif's (1993,1996) 
theoretical models and case studies of the control of cheating among traders in the 
Mediterranean.   Our paper is also related to the corporate finance literature 
dealing with firm-investor interactions (eg Diamond (1991)).   As in our paper, 
Diamond considers firms of heterogeneous types, however he focuses on adverse 
selection rather than moral hazard.   Also, his model is not a prisoner's dilemma, 
but considers different types of projects the borrower could invest in, and shows 
that if adverse selection is strong, reputation effects are insufficient to lead to 
choice of good projects.   Unlike in our model, investors are dying every period, 
to be replaced by a new set, so that "credit history" forms the only constraint on 
future behavior.   Luck plays an important role in the Diamond model.   He shows 
that while for the worst borrowers neither reputation nor intermediation (in the 
form of banks) can ensure good project selection, and for the top borrowers 
reputation alone suffices, intermediation is useful for the middle range borrowers.   
In our model however, once there is intermediation, all firms benefit from 
becoming the intermediary's clients, because no one wants to invest in them 
otherwise.   Thus even honest types can benefit from becoming clients. 
  Campbell and Kracaw (1980) make intermediation endogenous - an 
intermediary is an investor with sufficient initial wealth to credibly invest in 
information production.   Our model however does not explicitly model 
intermediary formation.   A major difference in results is that while their paper 
stresses that competition between intermediaries makes collusion between 
overvalued firms and intermediaries less likely [as in their setup such firms have 
to pay each intermediary to suppress damaging information about their prospects] 
in our model collusion is negatively related to the expected lifespan of the 
intermediary which is arguably the higher, the lower the extent of competition in 
the intermediation market.   
 
 6
In the empirical literature, studies of the effect of the provision of non 
audit services on auditing firms' tendency to qualify a report have yielded mixed 
results.   Wines (1994) finds a negative association,  suggestive of the collusive 
mechanisms modeled in our paper and suggested by the anecdotal evidence 
surrounding the recent corporate scandals,  in which non-separation of audit and 
non audit services like consultancy, or between investment banking and research,  
created conflicts of interest.  However other studies [eg Barkess and Simnett 
(1994)] find no association between the tendency to qualify a report and non audit 
services.   We note that Barkess and Simnett's sample was from the top auditing 
firms for whom life expectancy as well as reputational concerns were presumably 
higher and this in the context of our model would reduce tendencies to collude.   
Craswell, Stokes and Laughton (2002) find that having controlled for non audit 
services, the proportion of total fees contributed by the auditing fees of the client 
have no effect.   However, it is to be noted that in many of these studies the non 
audit fee component may be mismeasured, leaving out (for example) such non 
monetary effects such as the dependence of research analysts' fees on the number 
of investment banking mandates they brought in.   This measurement error would 
tend to bias the coefficients on non audit services towards zero.   Also, the 
dependent variable in such studies should be the number of reports where auditors 
detect an error, but do not report it (rather than the number of reports they qualify) 
- but unfortunately it is not possible to observe this. 
     
3. The Assumptions of the Model  
 
We call player 1 the firm3, and player 2 the investors with whom it is 
engaged in a relationship.  Players are of the types specified in the introduction.   
We assume that α and 1-α represent the proportions of firms of honest and 
opportunistic types.   Firms live on indefinitely unless investors withdraw their 
                                                 
3 We can think of the “firm” as denoting insiders who play decisive roles in the operation of the 
business. “Investors” refers to outside financiers who may be shareholders or lenders.  For 
simplicity we treat the insiders as a single decision-making unit – alternatively we can think of the 
insiders as merely comprising of a “manager” who takes all the decisions including whether or not 
to cheat the outsiders. 
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funds from them.   To keep the proportions of different firm types constant we 
assume that whenever a firm dies out it is replaced by another firm of the same 
type.   Investors are assumed to be infinitely lived.  In the initial period investors, 
based on their future expected payoff from investing, decide whether or not to 
invest.   If they never invest to start with, they get 0.   If they do invest initially, 
they may choose to withdraw or not at an intermediate stage in response to an 
early warning signal which warns of cheating, though with imperfect accuracy.  
They then choose at the beginning of each subsequent period between 
withdrawing and staying with their original choices.  Meanwhile, at the outset of 
each period, opportunistic firms decide whether to play honest or to cheat.   
  The payoff matrix in the stage game is as follows: 
Player 2 (investors) 
                                  Invest/buy (B)           Withdraw/sell (S)         Withdraw only 
                                                                   at intermediate stage       at the end 
Player 1 Honest (H)                        1,H H2 1,L Z−                                1 2,H H Z−  
(firm)         
             Cheat (C)                               1 2,W L 0, Z−                                1 2,W Z L− +
    given 
                                          > >0>  and >0> 1W 1H 1L 2H Z− . 
Payoffs are realized at the end of each period when they become known 
(to the firm of course) and to its investors, but not to the public at large (unless 
auditors are in action – a possibility that we consider in a later section).  The case 
where payoffs are observable by the general public and not just by the concerned 
investors is also analyzed in a later section.   
All investors get to know whether they have been cheated after the 
realization of their payoffs.  However, there is an early warning signal that is 
observable at an intermediate stage by the investors in any firm.  If the signal 
warns of cheating, the investors have the choice of withdrawing early, incurring 
the withdrawal cost of Z  but avoiding the final (negative) payoff of .  We 
assume that these are imperfect signals.   Accordingly, if firms cheat, this is 
2L
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revealed to investors via these signals with a probability π < 1, while with 
probability 1-π cheats go undetected.  
  The interpretation of the payoffs is as follows.   If the firm acts honestly,  
and investors also invest,  the firm gets a positive payoff  while the investor 
also gets a positive amount where we can think of  as an expectation taken 
over all the possible states (where states are exogenous,  a function of luck) the 
firm could be in (but provided it was acting honestly).   The firm however has an 
incentive to deviate and cheat, because > , but in this case the investor 
makes losses:  is negative which means that the investor does worse than if he  
1H
2H
1W 1H
2L
had never invested.   If the investor withdraws, he gets a stage payoff of 
Z− irrespective of whether the firm is acting honestly or not.   Here we assume 
that Z  is the cost of withdrawing funds.  It captures the transaction or illiquidity 
associated costs of selling out.  We characterize Z  as being fixed which may 
represent some sort of lock in effect such as the Tobin taxes on portfolio 
investments.   Finally <0 can be interpreted as a loss the firm suffers if it is 
liquidated (because the investors have withdrawn) despite having acted honestly.  
We assume that the firm gets a higher payoff of 0 if it cheats and the investors 
withdraw, because while cheating it can consume some gains and it is not possible 
to deprive it of these even if it is liquidated (the figure 0 is just chosen for 
convenience, but the point is really that the firm can do a little better if it cheated,  
even if the investors withdraw). 
1L
The first set of inequalities - > >0> - implies that in the one stage 
game cheating is always a strictly dominant strategy for the opportunistic firm.    
The investor prefers not to sell if the firm is acting honestly,  but if the firm is 
cheating,  selling out early (a possible action in response to an early warning 
signal, which we will discuss shortly) may be worthwhile in the stage game 
depending on the relative magnitudes of 
1W 1H 1L
Z and .   In particular withdrawing in 
response to an early signal dominates the third strategy of withdrawing only after 
the end of the period – as in that case investors would incur both the withdrawal 
cost 
2L
Z  and the loss . We note that the prisoners' dilemma here may be one 2L
 9
sided as  > 0 >2H Z−  but it is possible that Z− >  : in this case the investor 
does not have a strictly dominant strategy - but the firm will always wish to 
deviate from playing H.  In this event the Nash equilibrium of the stage game is 
C,S.   
2L
 
 
4.Equilibria without Intermediation 
     
       We now investigate the types of sustainable equilibria.  Opportunistic firms 
must decide between playing Honest and Cheat given investors' play.   Investors 
must decide between playing B and S - returns to doing so differ depending on 
whether firms are playing H or C in equilibrium.    
An honest equilibrium is one in which investors expect all firms to play H 
and firms find it optimal to do so as long as investors act on this premise. 
A cheating equilibrium is one in which (1) all opportunistic firms cheat, 
(2) investors have rational expectations, therefore they expect a fraction 1 α−  of 
all firms to play C.  There will be sub-cases of cheating equilibria depending on 
whether investors find it optimal to withdraw upon receipt of a bad early signal. 
The sequential structure of the equilibrium line of play in a cheating 
equilibrium is as follows.  Investors decide to invest or not, according to whether 
they expect non-negative returns or not.  If investors do invest, a fraction α  of all 
firms plays H while the rest find it profitable to play C.  A fraction π  of the 
(1 α− )N cheating firms (where N denotes the total number of firms) is identified 
by an early signal before realization of payoffs. Investors then have an 
opportunity of withdrawing from these (1 )π α− N detected cheating firms at a 
loss of Z  but without incurring the negative pay-off .  At the end of the period, 
outcomes are realized.  Honest firms and their investors receive payoffs ( ).   
Investors in cheating firms receive a penalty of . They also have a choice of 
withdrawing (S) or continuing in the same firm (B). Withdrawal results in an 
additional loss of 
2L
1,H H2
2L
Z ; however, all investors who withdraw, at this stage or the 
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earlier one, now have the opportunity of reinvesting in another firm with the same 
profit expectations as in the phase described above (as this is an indefinitely 
repeated game).   
We now discuss when a cheating equilibrium is possible. 
     
Proposition 1: If αH2 + (1 – α)L2 > 0, there exists a cheating equilibrium in which 
the habitually honest firms play H and their investors respond to this by playing B 
every period.  So the honest firms’ and their investors’ respective long run payoffs 
are 1
1
H
δ−  and 
2
1
H
δ−  . 
 
Proof:   Habitually honest firms are not optimizers, and play H by definition.   To 
start with, an investor cannot distinguish an intrinsically honest type from an 
opportunist.  However as long as αH2 + (1 – α)L2 > 0, the investor’s expected 
payoff is positive and he chooses to invest.   The investor has no cause to 
withdraw from a habitually honest firm, because (a) he will never receive an early 
signal about cheating on the part of such a firm, and (b) after observing H2, his 
realized payoff at the end of the period, he will not want to withdraw either,  as he 
realizes that the firm has not cheated.   Thus he stays with the same firm and plays 
B each period.  The payoffs, for the honest firm and the investor, are H1 and H2 
per period for ever.  Q. E. D. 
   
         For the (1 )π α− N firms who are caught early, investors have a choice of 
playing S or B.   If investors withdraw, they incur the early withdrawal cost Z  but 
are free to invest elsewhere from the next period.   If they play B however they 
keep getting the same loss  for all time. 2L
The remaining (1 )(1 )α π− − N firms are discovered by their investors to be 
cheating only when the latter get their payoffs.   These investors, again, choose 
between S and B, with the difference that if they withdraw they cannot avoid 
realizing the one time loss  in addition to having to pay 2L Z - as in the previous 
case,  they are free to invest elsewhere from the next period. 
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 This situation where opportunistic firms are cheating is compatible with 
two distinct kinds of investor behavior (that we label strategies 1 and 2), 
depending on the parameter values. 
1. The investor invests in a firm and doesn't withdraw, even if alerted by an early 
signal that the firm is cheating – essentially because the high cost of withdrawal 
exceeds the present value of his anticipated losses due to his firm’s cheating. Then 
he won't withdraw from a firm that is revealed to be cheating only after the 
declaration of outcomes. Here 
                                           1 22
(1 )
1
2H LV α αδ
+ −= −  > 0                                           (1) 
where the subscript on V denotes the player and the superscript the strategy.  The 
function jiV  denotes player i’s lifetime present value from playing strategy j.  In 
the text of this paper, though not in the appendix, we assume that (1) holds,  it is 
always profitable ex-ante to invest,  either because the payoff in case the firm acts 
honestly is large or because the proportion of intrinsically honest firms is high 
enough to ensure a positive expected value from investment. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
2. The investor invests, but will withdraw if the declaration of outcomes reveals 
that the firm was cheating. In that case, he would certainly have withdrawn if he 
received an early signal to the same effect. Here the payoff to this strategy is     
2 22
2 2(1 )( ) (1 )(1 )1
HV Z V 2L
α α δ α πδ= + − − + + − −−  
or 2 22 2
1 [ (1 ) (1 )(1 )
1 (1 ) 1
HV Z ]Lα α α πδ α δ= − − + −− − − −                   (2) 
At this point we can ask : can there be in equilibrium a strategy where the 
investor invests, withdraws if alerted by an early signal that the firm is cheating, 
but does not do so if he learns of this only after results are declared?  The answer 
is negative.   The declaration of outcomes at the end of the first period reveals that 
the firm is cheating - the investor who stays with the firm is assured of a perpetual 
loss of  per period - a loss the present value of which outweighs the withdrawal 2L
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cost Z  (as indicated by the assumption that he would have divested if he received 
an early warning of cheating).   In a subgame-perfect equilibrium, therefore,  this 
strategy is dominated by strategy 2. 
To find the conditions under which each of these strategies is optimal, we 
need to compare the relative payoffs. 
Comparing strategies (1) and (2), 
2 1
2 2V V≥  
if and only if 
                     
*
2 2 2[ ]1
Z H L L Zαδ πδ≤ − − =−                                 (3) 
where the cutoff *Z  is an increasing function of π .  [Differentiation instantly 
tells us that the derivative of *Z  with respect to π  is - >0 as <0.]  2L 2L
From Figure 1, we can define two zones in (π , Z ) space.   Zone 1 lies to 
the right of *Z .  In this region we have  [from (3)], and of course from (1) 
we know that strategy 1 is a profitable strategy.   Therefore in Zone 1, investors 
follow strategy 1. 
1
2V V> 22
The line forming the boundary between Zones 1 and 2 is upward sloping 
indicating that *Z  is increasing in π .  To the left of this line, in Zone 2, we have 
Z  less than *Z  and (3) and (1) tell us that in this region, 
2 1
2 2 0V V> >  
 hence in this region investors follow strategy 2 which is also a profitable strategy.    
We note that assuming (1), that strategy 1 is always a profitable one, 
means that we do not need to use a separate profitability condition for strategy 2.  
This changes if we drop (1), that is, assume that it may not always be ex ante 
profitable to invest.  We deal with this case in the appendix. 
The equations and inequalities above define the regions of the parameter 
space in which the specified investor behavior is compatible with equilibrium, 
given that opportunistic firms are cheating. But when would firms find it 
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worthwhile to cheat? The two zones defined above provide very different 
incentives for the opportunistic firm. 
    1.   In Zone 1, the firm's anticipated profits are 
1 1 1 1max[ , ]V H V W 1Vδ δ= + +                                     (4) 
1 1W Vδ= +  
  or 
1
1 1
WV δ= −                                                       (5) 
 so that the firm always cheats and a cheating equilibrium is sustainable.   The 
firm knows that if it cheats,  investors will not withdraw being locked in by high 
withdrawal costs.   On the other hand, investors find it optimal to invest in the 
first place even if they expect all opportunistic firms to cheat, as by (1) the high 
proportion of habitually honest firms in the population ensures a positive expected 
payoff for them . 
 
 2.   In Zone 2, 
                                  1 1 1 1max[ , (1 ) ]V H V W 1Vδ π δ= + − +                                      (6) 
 
The first term in brackets shows the firm's payoff if it is honest, while the second 
shows that if the firm cheats, it gets  with a probability of 11W π− , the probability 
of its escaping detection.  We note that even though investors withdraw after their 
payoffs reveal cheating, by then the firm has already obtained its one period 
cheating gains - in the next period it simply gets continuation payoffs from a fresh 
set of investors.  With probability π  its cheating is detected early and it gets 0 in 
the current period as investors withdraw in response to the early signal - in which 
case withdrawal is too early for the firm to realize its gains from cheating. 
 
The firm will then cheat if 
                                                   1 1(1 )W Hπ− >  
 or if                                    
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 *1 1
1
W H
W
π π−< =                                                        (7) 
and will be honest otherwise in this region. A cheating equilibrium is possible 
only for a low enough probability of detection.   Thus the investors' equilibrium 
strategy here is to withdraw only if they receive a bad early signal, while the 
opportunistic firms' is to be honest for a sufficiently high probability of detection, 
and otherwise to cheat. 
As Figure 1 shows, there are several possible types of steady states 
depending on parameter values.   Zone 1 is a region where firms always cheat.  
Zone 2 is itself split into two regions depending on values of π  - firms are honest 
for π  above or equal to *π  and cheat otherwise.  
The fact that the line separating zones 1 and 2 is upward sloping implies 
that while opportunistic firms are sometimes honest for low withdrawal costs, the  
range of such honest equilibria increases with improvements in transparency (ie in 
the accuracy of the public signal).   For a highly accurate public signal, firms will 
be always honest for a greater range of values of Z .   
     The regions in which one sided intermediation by agencies such as 
external auditors and credit rating agencies could have a role are in the lower part 
of Zone 2 (where π < *π ) and in Zone 1.   Is it conceivable that employing an 
intermediary of this kind (who, to reiterate a point made in the introduction, is 
paid by the firm but supposed to serve the investors' interest) might influence the 
type of steady state the economy ends up in?  We examine this question in the 
next section. 
 
 
     
 5. Equilibrium with Intermediaries 
     
 An intermediary of the sort described above is assumed to have a survival 
probability of λ ≤1. Here λ  is treated as an exogenous                             
parameter though if we were to model the form of competition in the 
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intermediation market there would be scope for endogenizing it.   Intermediaries 
die off at a random rate (1 – λ) per period. 
The auditor receives his fee at the outset of each period, investigates the 
activities of the firm and reports to the public at large at the outset of the next 
period.  Meanwhile, if he is not committed to honesty, he can try to increase his 
earnings from his client firm by demanding a bribe to be paid on delivery of a 
clean report or by threatening a false report of cheating unless paid extortion 
money.  These negotiations could occur either at the outset of the audit period or 
later after the cheating and perhaps the investigation have occurred;  however, 
agreement, if any, would specify that extra payments would be synchronized with 
the delivery of a good report. 
When cheating occurs, the intermediary can detect this with probability 1, 
in contrast to the probability π  of detection using the early warning signal.   
However detection for the intermediary occurs with a one period lag.   On the one 
hand this assumption allows the early signal to maintain a special role in enabling  
investors to withdraw early and avoid loss in the current period - instantaneous 
detection of cheating with probability 1 by the intermediary would render the 
early signal superfluous.   On the other hand, this assumption highlights the point 
that the basic role of the intermediary is to provide information about a firm's 
cheating to all investors.   Without intermediation, individual investors could infer 
from their payoffs that they had been cheated, and could choose to withdraw, but 
as this would not become public information the firm would still get a payoff next 
period from fresh investors. By becoming the client of an intermediary a firm can 
seek to signal its honesty and we derive conditions for an equilibrium where the 
client firms are indeed honest while no investors patronize the non client firms.    
We first postulate an equilibrium where the intermediary is honest, ie 
where it correctly identifies and signals honesty and cheating by firms without 
attempting collusion or extortion, and examine how its presence affects the 
scenario described in the previous section. (Later in this section we examine (a) 
conditions under which opportunistic intermediaries will act honestly, and (b) 
whether the cheating equilibria discussed earlier will in fact be replaced by honest 
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equilibria).      Assuming that all firms are customers of the intermediary, we 
calculate their relative gains to being customers over not being customers.   To do 
this we consider a situation where investors do not invest in any firms which are 
not the intermediary’s clients.  This does not seem to be an unrealistic assumption 
as most uninformed investors prefer not to invest in a firm whose claims are not 
rated or which is not certified by agencies of this kind.  As we proceed, it will also 
become evident that where other investors withdraw from firms that do not hire 
auditors, the best policy for an individual investor is to do likewise.  So from the 
point of view of the individual investor, avoiding firms that do not become the 
intermediary’s clients will be shown to be an optimal strategy. 
The relative payoffs to being a customer versus being a non customer of 
the intermediary are  for both honest and opportunistic types.  Both types of 
firms will get  if they become the auditor’s customers, but if they do not, they 
will not get any investment and hence will get zero.  If they already have existing 
investors at the time the auditor enters the picture, the honest types know that if 
they do not become customers,  their investors will respond by playing S while 
the honest firms, because of their type, will be constrained to play H and get the 
payoff <0.   Since they aim at profit maximization, subject to the honesty 
constraint, they exit and play their outside option which gives payoff 0, 
irrespective of investor type.   A similar assumption – that intrinsically honest 
types are rational enough to choose an outside option which is more profitable 
than placing themselves in a situation where their nature will constrain them to act 
honestly – is made in Dixit (2003).    For opportunistic firms with investor already 
in place at the time of entry of the auditor, the gain of becoming a customer is 
exactly the same as that of an honest type while if it is not a customer it gets 0 due 
to the investors' play of S to which it can respond by cheating.   The gain of both 
types of firms and accordingly their maximum willingness to pay the intermediary 
is therefore  .  We can show however that the intermediary's fee F must be less 
than the opportunist's and the honest types' gain .    
1H
1H
1L
1H
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  If an opportunistic firm is not a customer of the intermediary, it will never 
play honest.   Given investors’ strategies, one of two things can happen.  The first 
is that investors will not invest in any such firm (in which case the opportunist 
would never have a chance to either play honest or cheat, and would get a payoff 
of zero).  The second possibility is that if the firm already has investors when the 
auditor comes into being, investors will withdraw their funds and the opportunist 
will receive no future investment (in which case the opportunist will get a one-
time payoff of 0 if he cheats and <0 if he is honest – thus he will choose to 
cheat)
1L
4.  The implication of this is that the firm is paying the intermediary to 
signal its honesty.    Any investor who deviates by staying with a firm that does 
not hire an auditor will be cheated;  it is therefore optimal for him to withdraw 
from such firms. 
 
 
     Proposition 2:  When we restrict our attention to the part of Zone 2 
where there would have been cheating in the intermediary’s absence, the 
intermediary's fee F must be less than the opportunistic firms' gain from being its 
customer, (ie F< ) and the extent of the shortfall depends on the accuracy of the 
public signal 
1H
π . 
 
Proof:  We examine the conditions for an opportunistic firm to be honest and to 
be a customer of the intermediary.   Now, we can define , the long-term payoff 
of the firm, as the maximum of three alternatives – hiring an auditor and being 
honest, hiring an auditor but cheating nevertheless, and not hiring an auditor.  
Thus we have 
1V
1 1 1 1max[ , ,0]V H F V W F Vδ δ= − + − + 1  
where 1V  is the continuation payoff a cheat gets and is given by 
                                                 
4 This argument is only valid for Zone 2, as in Zone 1 investors are “locked in” by high 
withdrawal costs.  But we will show soon that in any case intermediation does not have a role to 
play in Zone 1.  Therefore, our argument is valid for the domain where intermediation can 
potentially be effective. 
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1 1 1(0 ) (1 )V V Vλ δ= + + −λ
1
                                 (8) 
Here the first term on the right hand side of (8) shows that if the intermediary 
detects cheating, the cheat receives the one time payoff 0 - in the next period he 
begins afresh and receives the continuation payoff of a cheat.   The second term 
shows   that if the intermediary does not survive into the next period, the firm can 
get away with cheating.  As the information about its cheating does not become 
common knowledge it can get a payoff from fresh investors even if the old ones 
were to withdraw subsequently. 
 Now for an opportunistic firm to hire an auditor and be honest, we must 
have 
1 1V H F Vδ= − +                                   (9) 
This must yield more than the second and third options.  By comparison with the 
third option, we must have 
1 0V >  
or 
1F H<                                                        (10) 
Moreover, by comparison with the second option, 
                11 1 1(1 ) ( )W H V Vπ δ− − ≤ −                                                      (11)                              
Now to relate the extent of the shortfall of F from  to 1H π , (8) and (9) give us 
1 11 1 1[ ] [V V H F V Vλ λδ− = − + − ]  
                            1[
1
H F ]λ
δλ
−= −                                            [using (9)] 
Substituting this in (11) and rearranging, 
                                F≤ 1 1 1
1((1 ) )H W H δλπ δλ
−− − −                        (12) 
    Now it is evident that the second term on the RHS of (12), is decreasing in π  , 
more so for λ <1.   The interpretation of this is that as the warning signal becomes 
more accurate the shortfall of F from the opportunistic firms’ gains diminishes, 
that is F increases while the opportunistic firms’ bargaining power falls.   This 
reflects the fact that as the accuracy of the signal increases, the opportunistic firm 
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has no good alternatives to not being the intermediary's customer, as it becomes 
increasingly difficult for it to cheat (and the only benefit from not being a 
customer is if one can cheat)5.   Of course if π  is so high that it exceeds *π  then 
the firm is always honest even without intermediation and the intermediary's 
services are not needed.   The impact of the signal would be similar for an 
infinitely lived intermediary, though weaker :  if the intermediary were infinitely 
lived, a cheating firm might be able to get away with cheating this period, but 
would be sure to be penalized from the next period as the intermediary could pass 
on information about its cheating with probability 1.  In Zone 2, the early signal 
would still retain a role by reducing the expected payoff to firms from cheating by 
enabling investors to withdraw at an intermediate stage. Q.E.D 
     
We also note that the investors' equilibrium strategy of not investing in 
any firms that are not the intermediary's clients,  makes sense, as the only reason 
for not being a client is if the firm wants to cheat.   Though for some parameter 
values investors do not refrain from investing in a cheat in the absence of 
intermediation, this reflects their inability to distinguish ex ante between cheats 
and honest firms and the probability of the firm being honest is high enough to 
ensure them a positive expected payoff.   Once they know however that a firm 
will be a cheat they have no incentive to invest in it. 
What are the policy implications of all this? Measures to improve the 
accuracy of the publicly observable signals, such as transparency measures like 
requiring the firm to disclose stock options as costs, are welcomed by 
intermediaries to a certain extent, insofar as it increases their fees.  However, 
intermediaries dislike too much transparency.   Their expected payoff decreases if 
markets are too efficient or internal accounting very transparent because this may 
                                                 
5 This dependence on early signal accuracy is valid only for Zone 2, because in Zone 1 investors 
are locked in by high withdrawal costs and cannot respond to the early signal. However, as 
mentioned in footnote 4, we will show later that in any case intermediation is not effective in 
ensuring honesty in Zone 1. Thus we can say that in the domain where intermediation can be 
effective, intermediaries have this sort of non-monotone preference over early signal accuracy. 
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mean that firms stay honest even without intermediation.  Investors, too, know 
this, therefore basically firms have no need to engage intermediaries. Firms 
unambiguously dislike greater transparency, as it worsens their bargaining 
position vis a vis intermediaries.   Of course another obvious policy implication 
that is evident from Figure 1 is that a decrease in the cost of withdrawal increases 
the likelihood of honest behavior among firms. 
Now we consider, first, the conditions needed to ensure honesty on the 
part of the intermediary.  Next we analyze in what zones of Figure 1 
intermediation (subject to the necessary conditions) can help in replacing cheating 
by an honest equilibrium, and summarize the properties of this equilibrium in a 
proposition. 
 
Collusion 
  
To analyze the conditions needed for honest behavior by the intermediary,  
we first consider the intermediary’s incentives to “collude” with a client firm by 
failing to report cheating behavior in exchange for a bribe.  It is possible that the 
intermediary may collude with its client firms to falsely furnish a report of 
honesty.  This possibility is particularly relevant in view of the fact that auditing 
firms for instance tended to perform profitable non audit services like consultancy 
or investment banking for their audit clients, and generous remuneration in one 
service may be linked to collusion in the other.   To introduce a cost of collusion 
into this framework we assume that there is some positive probability q that 
investors can, in the next period, detect that the intermediary has cheated them. 
This can for instance be because as intermediaries are relatively few in number,  
news about cheating behavior on their part is more likely to become public 
knowledge.   Here we consider q = 1 for simplicity6.   Therefore, the investors 
lose faith in the intermediary.   In this event the firm too stops using the 
                                                 
6 Note that investors can tell from their payoffs at the end of the period that they have been 
cheated. 
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intermediary's services for all time to come - as the investors have lost faith in it it 
is worthless to go on paying the intermediary.   This constitutes a loss for the 
intermediary.  Moreover, if the intermediary services n client firms, all n firms 
will find it worthless to go on paying an intermediary in which investors have lost 
faith.    
We have already described the timing of the negotiations between the firm 
and the intermediary on collusion and extortion.  What are the feasible strategies 
open to each of the agents in this game? 
Firms may or may not hire auditors for an agreed fee to start with.  In 
either case, they may or may not cheat.  If they have hired an auditor and cheated, 
they may or may not choose to bribe him by a secret extra payment simultaneous 
with  a favorable audit report.  If they have hired an auditor and not cheated, and 
the auditor demands a bribe for certifying to the fact, they may or may not pay.  
The auditor accepts a fee at the outset and investigates. If there has been 
cheating, he may report as much or suppress the facts for a bribe.  If there has 
been none, he could report this with or without additional demands.  He could of 
course negotiate about this in advance, rather than after the fact, though actual 
payments of course would only be made on delivery of the report. 
Investors watch whether firms hire auditors or not.  They may or may not 
get to know the auditor’s fees.  They then decide whether or not to invest in a 
firm.  At the commencement of the next period, they may withdraw or reinvest.  
The information available to them at this point includes the return they have 
received in the last period, the auditor’s report and the warning signal. 
Now we first examine the intermediary's non collusion condition.   Now 
we first examine the intermediary's non collusion condition.   It makes no sense 
for the intermediary to collude with just one (or a few) firms since its one-period 
cheating gains would be limited by one (or a few) firms’ one period cheating 
gains, while exposure would lead to the loss of its entire clientele.  Therefore, the 
intermediary will make the collusion offer to all its n clients – and, if collusion is 
at all worthwhile for any firm, the intermediary can hope for a positive response 
from all the (1 – α)n that are opportunistic. The maximum it can gain by collusion 
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are these (1 – α)n firms’ gains (1 – α)n ( 1W H1− ),  from deviating and playing 
Cheat7 ,  while its loss is the discounted value of n times its future fee,  beginning 
next period,  times the probability q (here, equal to one) that its collusion is 
detected by the investors.   So the condition is: 
(1 – α)n( 1W H1− ) < nF 1
δλ
δλ−  
or 
F > (1 – α) 1 1
1 [W H ]δλδλ
− −                                   (13) 
       What of an opportunist firm's incentive to initiate collusion with its 
intermediary by making an all-or-nothing offer where the firm keeps almost all of 
the one-time gain ?   The firm's maximum one time gains from collusion 
are .   From the next period, with probability q (=1) it is punished and 
loses its non deviation payoff ,  but in this case it terminates its relationship 
with the intermediary and so avoids paying F.   Thus the firm's no collusion 
condition is 
1W H− 1
11W H−
1H
1 1W H− <1
δλ
δλ−  1[ ]H F−  
or F <  1 (1 )H 1Wδλδλ
− −                                    (14) 
     
   For both the firm and the intermediary to have no incentive to collude we 
require  
1 1 1(1 )(1 )( ) (1 )W H H W1α δλ δλ− − − < − −  
or  1 1
1 (1 )(1 )
(2 )(1 )
W H α δλα δλ
+ − −< − −                    (15) 
 
                                                 
7 This presumes that they are not caught by the warning signal, at least in Zone 2. If collusion 
takes place ex-post, only firms which have successfully cheated, eluding damage from the early 
signal, can collude. 
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Noting that the coefficient of  in (15) exceeds 1, we can see that it is 
possible to satisfy (15) even though 
1H
1H W1< .   Moreover the factor is increasing 
inδ , in λ  and in α which implies that the higher the discount rate and the longer 
lived the intermediary, and the higher the proportion of honest firms, the more 
likely is it that neither party has an incentive to collude.   However, we note that 
collusion will not take place unless both parties are willing. 
 
 
 Extortion 
 
We next consider the intermediary’s propensity for “extortion”.  Can the 
intermediary threaten to falsely blacklist a client firm, extorting exorbitant fees 
not to do so?  Such a threat lacks credibility.  Should the client refuse to pay, it 
will not be in the interest of the auditor to implement his threat:  if he does, he 
gains nothing, but loses the patronage of his client for the rest of his life.  He may 
also acquire a bad reputation and lose other clients in consequence; and he runs 
the risk of being so exposed that he loses the trust of investors and, consequently, 
his entire clientele.  Since the client firm knows that the auditor’s threat is hollow, 
it would ignore the threat if it is made.  Therefore, it will not be made.  Extortion 
has no role in a subgame-perfect equilibrium8. 
Whether the auditor attempts to extort from a single client, or collectively 
from his entire clientele, one might argue that he has an incentive to implement 
his threat : if he does, he can establish a reputation as an extortionist who means 
business.  However, such a reputation can affect the firms’ decisions only in the 
next period, and since firms have a choice at the commencement of the next 
period of dismissing him, they will do so – especially because such a reputation 
deters not only firms but also investors from reposing their confidence in him.  In 
this sense the possibilities of extortion by auditors are far more limited than those 
                                                 
8 This assumes that the intermediary has no power to extract payment by force, or to make credible 
threats to do so. 
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of extortion by the mafia, who do not permit their clients the luxury of withdrawal 
from the relationship.  
 
Intermediation and the Domain of Honesty  
   
Now we ask in what zones of Figure 2, intermediation, subject to 
condition (13) – the conditions needed to rule out the intermediary’s propensities 
to engage in collusion – would result in cheating being replaced by honest 
equilibria.  In Zone 1, opportunistic firms find that if they do not hire an 
intermediary, investors believe that they are cheats and avoid them, so they get a 
payoff of 0.  However, such a firm can hire an intermediary for one period, cheat 
and then dismiss the intermediary.  This is because its old investors are locked in 
for eternity by high withdrawal costs (in this region) and in later periods the firm 
retains these investors and can save on the intermediary's fee by dismissing the 
intermediary.   Note that these investors cannot withdraw in response to an early 
signal either. Thus, in this region the firm's payoff to hiring an intermediary and 
then cheating, is 1
1
W
δ− -F.  This is greater than its payoff from hiring an 
intermediary and playing honest,  1
1
H F
δ
−
− ,  as >  and 1W 1H δ <1.   Thus the firm 
would cheat and no honest Nash equilibrium can be sustained in Zone 1. Investors 
also know this and in this range of parameters would attach no importance to the 
hiring of an auditor.  The firms, knowing this, will not hire an auditor.  A cheating 
equilibrium does not of course require intermediation. 
In contrast, in the lower part of Zone 2, the introduction of intermediaries 
(who behave honestly given condition (13) ) can result in cheating being replaced 
by an honest equilibrium.   As old investors are not locked in in this region, we 
merely require that the option of hiring an intermediary, then cheating and 
receiving the continuation payoff of a cheat, be less profitable than being honest 
and paying the intermediary.  We can easily verify that this corresponds to 
condition (12) (in the proof of Proposition 3) holding.  The option of not hiring an 
intermediary gives a payoff of zero, as before, and so is not adopted either. 
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 All this leads to the following proposition9 : 
Proposition 3 : Subject to conditions (12) and (13), the introduction of 
intermediation can lead to the replacement of cheating equilibrium in the lower 
part of Zone 2 (the region defined by inequalities (3) and (7)) by an honest 
equilibrium in which (a) all firms act honestly and engage the intermediary, (b) 
investors know this, always invest and reinvest each period,  (c) there is no 
collusion or extortion. 
 
The Determination of Audit Fees 
 
 How is the audit fee F determined?  Inequalities (13) and (14) set lower 
and upper limits to F, outside which collusion is profitable10.  Since these limits 
are defined in terms of the parameters of the system, the investor can figure out – 
if he knows the actual fee – whether the integrity of the audit can be relied upon.  
If the investor does not trust the intermediary, the firm has no incentive to hire 
him.   It follows that outside the limits set by (13) and (14), there is no demand for 
the intermediary’s services.  F must lie within these limits, whatever the structure 
of the market in the audit industry.  If there is intense competition among 
intermediaries, F will be driven down to the floor (13) while a monopolistic 
auditor (who can somehow rule out new entry) may be able to raise the fee to the 
ceiling (14). 
 
 Some Implications 
 
We turn to a discussion of some implications.  One major policy 
prescription which this work suggests is mandatory disclosure of audit fees, 
backed by heavy penalties for false disclosure.  As explained in the previous 
                                                 
9 As this proposition summarizes results we have argued through already, we do not offer a 
separate proof to avoid repetition. 
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paragraph, with mandatory disclosure investors can actually check whether the 
conditions for credible and effective auditing hold.  This is because, for parameter 
ranges in the lower part of Zone 2 (with low accuracy of the warning signal, but 
also relatively low values of withdrawal costs), auditing will be credible if audit 
fees lie in a certain range (defined by (13) and (14)).  So mandatory disclosure 
will guarantee the achievement of an honest equilibrium with auditing, which is a 
much stronger statement than saying that such an equilibrium could be supported 
given conditions (13) and (14).  Heavy penalties for false disclosure are however 
necessary to rule out misrepresentation of the audit fee.   
We have already discussed the intermediary’s non-monotone reaction to 
improvements in transparency,  favoring these at first and then opposing them.   
Now we consider measures to some extent incorporated in the Sarbanes-Oxley 
recommendations, such as the separation of audit from non audit activities, and 
the rotation of the clients of an auditor.   By limiting the scope of bribing auditors, 
the separation of audit and non-audit activities has the effect of ensuring that even 
if the conditions for no collusion are not satisfied, a wealth constraint prevents the 
firm from colluding with the intermediary.   That is, the two parties may be 
unable to collude, even if they wish to.    
Another policy measure of interest is the stipulation that an intermediary 
must rotate its clients.   Proponents of this measure argue that this will ensure that 
intermediaries and firms do not have enough time to build up networks which 
could make collusion easy. Opponents may argue that if the length of the 
intermediary's business relationship with a particular firm is shortened, it has 
more incentive to extort from that firm (as it in any case it knows that the firm 
cannot patronize it far into the future).  Our analysis shows that the latter 
argument is not valid.  Extortion by intermediaries is not sustainable.  
Nonetheless, a short length of business relationship would also tend to increase 
the intermediary’s incentives to collude, particularly if information about such 
behavior spread relatively slowly (that is, if q – which we have taken to be 1, for 
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simplicity – were small) as in this case a colluding auditor would have less to 
lose.11  
 
6. Intermediaries hired by Investors 
     
What if the intermediary were paid, not by firms, but by a consortium of 
investors in exchange for supplying information about firms?  Indeed credit rating  
agencies,  prior to their current system of publicly releasing ratings of firms listed  
with them,  used to charge investors for privately revealing information about 
specific firms these investors were interested in.   One problem with this that 
many have pointed out concerns appropriability.  It is easy for an individual 
investor who obtains the information from the intermediary, to pass it on to many 
others who do not have to pay the intermediary, therefore the intermediary is in 
effect able to appropriate only a small fraction of the total gains generated by the 
information it has supplied.   This is owing to the public good character of 
information.   Of course free rider problems are associated with this situation as 
no one investor may be willing to internalize the externalities of bearing the entire 
cost of paying the full value of the information.   To circumvent these issues to 
some extent, we do not assume that individual investors seek and pay for 
information, but rather that the intermediary sells information to a consortium of 
investors, who are all interested in the same firm. 
Assuming (we will check the conditions for this to hold later) that if  
investors are customers of the intermediary, this induces honesty among firms,  
the investors get 2
1
H
δ−  if they become customers of the intermediary,  regardless 
of whether they deal with firms of honest or opportunistic type.   On the other 
hand if they do not become customers, their payoffs are the following: 
(a)In Zone 1, 
                                                 
11 These possible adverse effects of frequent rotation of an auditor’s clients may help explain the 
results of some empirical studies on auditor tenure  – for example, Iyer and Rama (2004) find that 
short auditor tenures adversely affect audit quality, while Lee (2003) finds that short tenures have 
an adverse impact by increasing the manager’s accounting discretion. 
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1 2 2
2
(1 )
1
H LV α αδ
+ −= −  
 so investors are willing to pay up to the limit 
F* = 2 2(1 )( )
1
H Lα
δ
− −
−  
 (b)In Zone 2, for π < *π , 
  they get (without intermediation) a payoff of 
2 2
2 2
1 [ (1 ) (1 )(1 )
1 (1 ) 1
HV Z ]Lα α α πδ α δ= − − + −− − − − , 
so investors are willing to pay up to 
F** = 2 2
(1 ) [ (1
1 (1 )
H Z L) ]α πδ α
− + − −− −  
Here  
**
2
(1 )
1 (1 )
F Lαπ δ α
∂ −=∂ − − < 0 
 
so F** is decreasing in π . 
Here the intermediaries dislike transparency.  Not only is it the case that 
for high levels of transparency (π > *π ) their services are not needed, but even for 
lower levels of π , in Zone 2,  the ceiling on their fee is decreasing in 
transparency .   The intuition is that for an informative warning signal the 
investors' outside option to not hiring intermediaries pays better and so the 
investors' bargaining position vis a vis the intermediaries is strong for high levels 
of transparency.  We may also note that similar to the case of firm-hired 
intermediaries, these intermediaries will also be ineffective in Zone 1, as by the 
time they detect cheating, the old investors will already be “locked in” by high 
withdrawal costs.  Therefore intermediaries are in demand only when parameters 
correspond to the cheating zone in Zone 2. Hence these intermediaries' 
preferences over withdrawal costs as well as transparency are decreasing.   
This is illustrated in Figure 2 which shows how F** varies with π  for a 
given level of Z.   The downward sloping curve shows how the cap on the fee 
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diminishes with transparency for a given Z in Zone 2.  Beyond *π  the fee is zero 
as the intermediary is not needed.    
  It remains to check under what conditions the firms will act honest, once 
they know that investors are paying the intermediary.   We have already pointed 
out that this will not happen in Zone 1.  In the lower part of Zone 2, the maximum 
one shot gains they could get by cheating are 1W H1− .   On the other hand, as the 
intermediary will provide information about its cheating to investors, it will get 0 
in the future and will lose its payoff of  every period which it would have got if 
it had acted honestly – except in the event that the intermediary does not survive 
to tell the tale.   Therefore the no deviation condition is 
1H
                                         1 1 1
W H H1
δλ
δλ− < −  
 
1(1 )W H1δλ⇔ − <                                            (16) 
So intermediation will be effective for a sufficiently high discount factor( if the 
firm cares sufficiently about the future), or for a sufficiently long-lived 
intermediary. 
Can the intermediary double cross its customers (the investors) by 
accepting a side payment from firms in return for which it supplies its customers 
with false information about the firm?  The intermediary, after being hired by the 
investors, investigates the firm’s past performance and reports to its clients in 
time for them to decide on their next period’s investments.  Double-crossing is 
feasible if the intermediary and the firm can negotiate secretly between the hiring 
and the submission of the report on a side payment to be synchronized with this 
submission.  Should they choose to do so, investors act on this report (presumably 
favorable) and invest.  At the end of the period, they observe the outcome and 
decide whether or not to renew their contract with the intermediary and their 
investment in the firm. 
If there has been double-crossing, the investors find out in the next period 
with probability q (here assumed to be 1 as in the previous section) that they have 
been cheated, and in all future periods they refrain from patronizing the 
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intermediary.   The intermediary can extract a maximum bribe of  from 
the cheating firms (this is the case in which it extorts their entire cheating gains as 
a bribe).  However for all future periods it loses its fee F with probability q (=1).   
Therefore the no double crossing condition is: 
1W H− 1
                                          1 1 1
W H Fδλδλ− < −  
or 1 1
1 ( )F W Hδλδλ
−> −                                                   (17) 
 
This is very similar to the intermediary's no collusion condition (13) in the case 
when intermediaries are paid by firms, except for the honesty parameter in (13) 
and the fact that the fee F represents different things in the two constraints.   (17) 
should have a term indicating the size of the consortium employing the 
intermediary (to show that it stands to lose fees from its entire clientele).  Purely 
to economize on the use of symbols we treat this here as having a unit measure.   
Condition (17) is easier to satisfy for a long lived intermediary,  and for low levels 
of public transparency (as the intermediary's fee is decreasing in π ).   In the setup 
considered here, however, while analyzing the implications of policy measures 
such as the separation of audit and non audit activities and the compulsory 
rotation of clients, one has to remember that the clients are now investors.   
Therefore, these measures cannot be considered relevant to this setup, for where 
the intermediary performs services (auditing or other) for firms, the firms are its 
customers.   On the other hand policies which could have restricted the firms' 
ability to bribe the intermediaries would still have worked but would be more 
difficult to enforce as the firms were not the intermediary's customers.   Another 
interesting issue is the benefits of greater public transparency, to which 
intermediaries exhibit a different attitude than in the case where they were paid by 
firms. We also notice that in this case investors face a tradeoff - initially better 
transparency translates into a lower fee to be paid to intermediaries, but on the 
other hand, sufficiently low fees in turn may create an incentive for the 
intermediary to double cross the investors (unless the intermediaries operate in a 
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very sheltered market and hence have a long lifespan).   Of course, if transparency 
improves to the extent that π > *π  investors no longer have to hire intermediaries.  
     
7. Public Observability of Payoffs 
  
Up to this point, we have assumed that the fact of cheating by any firm is 
private information for the investors in that particular firm.  How does the 
analysis change if cheating becomes publicly known, whether because of the early 
warning signal or because outcomes are common knowledge? 
  In Zone 1, where investors are locked in by high withdrawal costs, there 
will be no change.  The firm will acquire a bad reputation after cheating for one 
period and will not be able to attract fresh investors.  But since its old investors 
cannot withdraw, it does not need fresh investment. 
In Zone 2, however,  the picture changes.  Investors can depart the 
cheating firm, possibly after being warned by the early signal, most certainly after 
the announcement of outcomes;  and there will be no fresh investment.  The 
continuation payoff of the cheat after the first period is 0.  Cheating is therefore a 
transient indulgence.  Its single-period reward is 1(1 )Wπ−  (taking into account 
that the cheat is not prematurely exposed by the early warning signal).  The 
opportunist firm compares this with the payoff from being honest for ever 1
1
H
δ− .  
It cheats if and only if 
** 1
1
1
(1 )
H
W
π π δ< = − − . 
Since **π  < *π , cheating will occur for a narrower range of parameters when it 
gets to be publicly known.  If **π <0, cheating will not occur at all.  We note that 
**π <0 is equivalent to  
1(1 )W H1δ− <                                     (18) 
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Comparing (18) with (16), we see that (18) will always hold if (16) does.  Thus if 
an investor-hired intermediary (irrespective of its lifespan) were to be effective in 
deterring cheating in a situation where payoffs were not common knowledge, then 
there would never be any cheating if payoffs were common knowledge.   
Common knowledge of cheating eliminates any role for the auditor.  The 
auditor’s only function was to convey to the public at large the fact of cheating 
with a one period lag – this too with limited reliability because of  the possibility 
of collusion and the limited lifespan of the auditor.  This function is now rendered 
superfluous.  We should note that this strong result is obtained only because in 
this simple model, being able to observe payoffs can indicate to the investors for 
certain whether cheating has taken place.   
  
8. Conclusion 
     
This paper has shown how a one sided prisoners' dilemma between firms 
and investors could lead to different steady states depending on the accuracy of 
publicly observable signals and the costs of withdrawing funds.   It has shown 
conditions under which one sided intermediation could lead to equilibria where 
the firms act honestly.  It has also examined incentives for the firm and the 
intermediary to collude.   It turns out that in the current setup where firms pay 
intermediaries, credible intermediation can be achieved in some parameter ranges 
where cheating equilibria would have prevailed in an intermediary’s absence - 
provided audit fees lie within a certain range. Moreover, this would be guaranteed 
if audit fee disclosure were made mandatory, with heavy penalties for false 
disclosure.  We find that firm-hired intermediaries like greater transparency (more 
informative public signals) but only to a certain extent, and firms tend to dislike 
transparency, as do intermediaries hired by investor consortia.  It also appears that 
longer lived intermediaries are less prone to collude, which is an indirect benefit 
of the low level of competition among intermediaries in today's markets.  We 
discuss the implications of measures designed to prevent collusion, such as the 
 33
separation of audit and non audit activities and compulsory rotation of auditing 
companies' clients.   We explain why the latter measure may entail costs, not just 
benefits.   For investors hiring an intermediary, improvements in transparency 
constitute a mixed blessing, as long as intermediaries still have to be hired.  While 
the improvements reduce the fees investors have to pay, they also increase the risk 
of being double-crossed.    
Closely related issues include the analysis of the effects of requiring top 
level managers to sign statements certifying that they have verified the internal 
accounting of their firms.   Will this have the desired effect?   If the managers 
discount the future heavily they may prefer to collude with others inside the firm 
and reap large one time gains, despite the threat to their career in the future.   
Again reputation effects, this time with regard to the reputation of the manager, 
would play an important role.   Other ways in which the model could be extended 
to incorporate intra firm interactions include the fact that while we have modeled  
the benefits to collusion as monetary, they could be power related.   For instance,  
interlocking directorships between firms and auditors or investment bankers could  
mean that an auditor might furnish a false good report on a firm in exchange for 
the firm executives' influence on making top level hiring or promotional decisions 
as part of the auditing firm's board of directors.   Rigorously modeling these intra 
firm interactions are however beyond the scope of this present paper. 
     
     
 Appendix 
We now consider the case where (1) does not hold,  ie it is better not to 
invest than to invest and never withdraw even when one receives proof of 
cheating either by an early signal or by observation of the outcome.   This could 
be so either because the proportion of intrinsically honest types is low or because 
the payoff even in times of honesty is not high enough to result in an ex ante 
positive expected value.  Now strategy 1 is no longer a profitable strategy.   As for 
strategy 2,  we need the following profitability condition: 
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2
2 0V >  
⇒ 2 2(1 )(1 )(1 )
HZ Lα πδ α< +− − −                            (A1) 
 
In Appendix Figure 1 strategy 2 is the preferred strategy to the left of the non-
negativity condition (A1) as it is the only profitable strategy : to the right of (A1),  
strategy 2 is no longer profitable,  therefore there is no investment.  Thus in this 
case investors either follow strategy 2 (of withdrawing after realization of a bad 
outcome, even if the public signal had not detected cheating) for very low 
withdrawal costs while otherwise they do not invest. 
The analysis of the firms' responses is the same as in the text though now 
as strategy 1 is eliminated,  there is no zone where (opportunistic) firms always 
cheat,  irrespective of π .   For areas where strategy 2 is played, firms are honest 
only if π  lies above *π ,  otherwise they cheat.   As in the text intermediation 
could result in an honest equilibrium in this region if (12) and (13) hold. 
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